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LOOKING FOR A SOLUTION: DETERMINING
FETAL STATUS FOR PRENATAL DRUG ABUSE
PROSECUTIONS
I. INTRODUCTION
A study by the National Association for Prenatal Addic-
tion Research and Education revealed that approximately
375,000 babies per year suffer potential health damage from
in utero exposure to drugs.' In reaction, several states have
attempted to punish pregnant women for negligent or reck-
less conduct that harms or may harm their fetuses.2 Since
1985, at least 200 women in thirty states have been crimi-
nally prosecuted for the use of illicit drugs or alcohol during
pregnancy through a variety of tactics. 3 For example, prose-
cutions have granted a fetus the legal rights of a person by
reading protection into criminal negligence statutes and then
taking custody of children who have been exposed to drugs in
utero for negligence.4 Until June 1996 in Whitner v. South
Carolina,5 however, no state supreme court had upheld a
1. Marcy Tench Stovall, Looking for a Solution: In re Valerie D and State
Intervention in Prenatal Drug Abuse, 25 CONN. L. REV. 1265 (1993) (citing Jane
E. Brody, Widespread Abuse of Drugs by Pregnant Women Is Found, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 30, 1988, at Al). Bonnie Steinbock, Pregnant Addicts, in THE
BEGINNING OF HuMAN LIFE 273 (Fritz K. Beller & Robert F. Weir eds., 1994)
(citing Anna Quindlen, Hearing the Cries of Crack, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 7, 1990).
Anna Quindlen, a New York Times columnist, describes the neonatal intensive
care unit of Bronx Lebanon Hospital as "filled with baby misery: ... babies born
weighing little more than a hardbook cover; babies that look like wizened old
men in the last states of terminal illness, wrinkled skin clinging to chicken
bones."
2. Note, Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs: The Case Against the Crimi-
nalization of "Fetal Abuse," 101 HARV. L. REV. 994 (1988) [hereinafter Maternal
Rights and Fetal Wrongs]. For arguments in favor of fetal abuse statutes, see
Jeffrey Parness, Crimes Against the Unborn: Protecting and Respecting the Po-
tentiality of Human Life, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 97, 171-72 (1985); Sam S. Bal-
isy, Maternal Substance Abuse: The Need to Provide Legal Protection for the Fe-
tus, 60 S. CAL. L. REV. 1209, 1235 (1987).
3. Philip H. Jos et al., The Charleston Policy on Cocaine Use During Preg-
nancy: A Cautionary Tale, 23 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 120 (1995).
4. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 995. See, e.g., In re
Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331
(N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
5. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
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conviction for prenatal abuse based on a child abuse statute.6
Decisions such as Whitner create a growing problem because
such prosecutions are readily gaining popular support with-
out addressing the implications for women.
The outcome of prosecutions for prenatal drug abuse
rests on the legal status accorded to the fetus and relative
weight given to the mother's privacy interest relative to the
fetus or state.7 For example, a pregnant woman can only be
prosecuted for child abuse if her fetus is considered a child.8
Prosecutions of fetal abuse under the rubric of child abuse
statutes raise important issues because, by granting a fetus
the status of a born person, they necessarily pit a woman's
constitutionally granted privacy rights against the state in-
terest in protecting a fetus. Thus, the success or failure of
prenatal drug abuse prosecutions rests on the legal status ac-
corded to the fetus and the extent to which the balancing of
the mother's interest relative to the fetus or state is permis-
sible.
However, neither statutory law nor case law has clearly
established the relationship between the mother and fetus.9
A direct result of the law's uncertainty regarding the legal
status of fetuses, prosecutions for prenatal abuse have
yielded disparate outcomes, many of which tread heavily on
the rights of women.'" There are three possible conceptual
models which characterize the rights of a pregnant woman in
relation to her fetus: (1) the fetus and mother both possessing
distinct and separate rights; (2) the mother and fetus as a
union whose rights are simultaneously intertwined; and
(3) the fetus having no rights.'1 Prosecutions for fetal abuse
follow the first model, whereby a woman is distinct from her
fetus and, thus, has interests at odds with her fetus. How-
ever, this comment argues that such a view of fetal rights is
inconsistent with legal precedent established in Roe v. Wade"
6. Id.
7. See infra Part II.C.
8. Angelau M.W. v. Kruzicki, 541 N.W.2d 482, 484 (Wis. 1995).
9. See infra Part II.
10. Lawrence J. Nelson, The Mother and Fetus Union: What God Has Put
Together, Let No Law Put Asunder?, in THE BEGINNING OF HUMAN LIFE 301,
305 (Fritz K. Belier and Robert F. Weir eds., 1994); see infra Part II.
11. See infra Part II.C.
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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and Planned Parenthood v. Casey.3
This comment begins by summarizing arguments for and
against coercive fetal abuse prosecutions."' After describing
three potential models of the relationship between maternal
and fetal rights, 5 this comment illustrates that several fetal
abuse prosecutions have been problematic because they ac-
cord a legal status to the fetus distinct from the mother
which relegates the mother to the equivalent of a fetal con-
tainer. 6 In addition, this comment examines the extent to
which prosecutions for prenatal abuse, which treat the
mother and fetus as having competing rights, violate estab-
lished precedent regarding the legal status of a fetus, as es-
tablished in Roe v. Wade and Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
and unjustifiably impinge on a woman's protected liberty."
Finally, this comment demonstrates that in order to prose-
cute for fetal abuse, the state must account for the union be-
tween mother and fetus, as recognized in Roe v. Wade and
Planned Parenthood v. Casey."6 Therefore, prosecutions for
prenatal abuse must not impinge unnecessarily on the
woman's right to privacy and bodily integrity.9 This com-
ment concludes that coercive punitive measures should be
avoided in the context of fetal abuse regulations and argues
in favor of preventative measures that could ensure better
20
access to drug treatment centers for pregnant women.
II. BACKGROUND
Prosecutions for prenatal substance abuse involve both
prebirth seizures and postbirth sanctions. 21  These are
deemed coercive because they rely on the State's power to
sanction people to compel certain behavior. Opponents of co-
ercive prosecutions favor a less intrusive approach which fo-
cuses on preventing the problem rather than punishing un-
wanted conduct. Therefore, those who oppose coercive fetal
13. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
14. See infra Part II.A-B.
15. See infra Part II.C.
16. See infra Part II.A.
17. See Planned Parenthood of S.E. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
18. See Nelson, supra note 10, at 302-03.
19. See infra Part VI.
20. See infra Parts IV, VI; see also Steinbock, supra note 1.
21. See Nelson, supra note 10, 309-15.
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abuse prosecutions advocate for improved prenatal education
and drug or alcohol counseling.
A. Arguments for Coercive Fetal Abuse Prosecutions
Proponents of fetal abuse statutes argue that unaborted
fetuses have a future interest in their well-being, such that
maternal acts or omissions which endanger the fetus should
be prosecuted." For example, John Robertson, a well-known
advocate of this position, who favors some coercive measures
to protect unborn children, argues that it is the future child,
not the fetus, who is the intended beneficiary of protective
legislation, making a distinction between freedom to procre-
ate and freedom in procreation.23 Robertson argues that once
a woman decides to carry a pregnancy to term she does not
have a constitutional right to make her own decisions about
how her pregnancy will be conducted.24 Thus, a woman has a
legal duty not to put her fetus at risk and can be subject to
homicide or child abuse charges for violating that duty.25
Proponents of coercive fetal abuse prosecutions further
argue that although parents have a great deal of discretion in
deciding how to raise their children, they do not have abso-
lute freedom because they are morally and legally obligated
not to inflict harm on their children. 6 Parents who injure
their children or fail to provide adequate food, clothing or
medical care can have their children taken away from them
and may even face criminal sanctions.27 Thus, proponents
argue that if the coercive power of the state can be used to
protect children, then it should be permissible to use state
coercion against a woman who injures her child before it is
born by her prenatal conduct.28
B. Arguments Against Coercive Fetal Abuse Prosecutions
Conversely, opponents of coercive state action for actions
22. Mary A. Warren, Women's Rights versus the Protection of Fetuses, in
THE BEGINNING OF HUMAN LIFE 287 (Fritz K. Beller & Robert F. Weir eds.,
1994).
23. John A. Robertson, Procreative Liberty and the Control of Conception,
Pregnancy, and Childbirth, 69 VA. L. REV. 405, 410-11 (1983).
24. Id.
25. Id. at 438-39.
26. Steinbock, supra note 1, at 275-76.
27. Id. at 276.
28. Id.
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taken during pregnancy that cause harm to a fetus argue
that many women have been singled out for special prosecu-
tions and additional penalties solely because they were preg-
nant at the time of drug use.29 These opponents do not main-
tain that pregnant women are immunized from prosecution
under generally applicable criminal statutes that would
punish illegal drug use.3" They emphasize that prosecutions
have relied upon criminal statutes for drug delivery and dis-
tribution which impose harsher penalties upon these women
than would otherwise be imposed for drug possession."
Furthermore, these opponents contend that prosecutions
for prenatal substance abuse have the effect of deterring
women from seeking drug treatment which could end the
drug abuse and prevent fetal harm. 2 For instance, a report
by the United States General Accounting Office ("USGAO")
described fear of prosecution and loss of custody as a "barrier
to treatment" for pregnant women dependent on drugs.33
Women are also deterred from seeking prenatal care or re-
fraining from telling their physicians about their drug use,
which could "help prevent or at least ameliorate many of the
problems and costs" associated with drug-exposed births. 4
The American Medical Association ("AMA") has also ex-
pressed similar concerns about prosecutions for drug use
during pregnancy by noting that, even if the health of a few
children was promoted, the overall effect would be detrimen-
29. Dawn Johnsen, Substance Abuse During Pregnancy: Legal and Social
Responses: Shared Interests: Promoting Healthy Births Without Sacrificing
Women's Liberty, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 569, 579 (1992) (discussing approaches to
fetal abuse prosecutions which do not invade women's right to privacy); see, e.g.,
United States v. Vaughn, 117 Daily Wash. L. Rptr 441 (D.C. Super. Ct. 1989).
In Vaughn, the defendant was a pregnant woman imprisoned for 180 days for
check forgery because she tested positive for cocaine use and the judge wanted
to prevent further cocaine use during pregnancy. Id.
30. See Johnsen, supra note 29.
31. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992). In Johnson v.
State, 578 So. 2d 412 (Fla. 1991), prosecutors convicted Jennifer Clarise John-
son of cocaine distribution to a minor for cocaine ingested by the baby after
birth but before the umbilical cord was cut. However, Johnson v. State, 602 So.
2d 1288 (Fla. 1992), held that the conviction should be overturned because the
statute did not clearly apply to these facts.
32. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 575.
33. Id. at 603 (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG EXPOSED
INFANTS: A GENERATION AT RISK (1990)).
34. Id. (quoting U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS: A
GENERATION AT RISK (1990)).
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tal to many more children. 5 Therefore, coercive sanctions
may result in more medically disastrous births, "more prema-
ture deliveries due to the lack of prenatal care, more con-
cealed pregnancies, unattended births, more infant aban-
donment, and perhaps a resurgence of infanticide, as women
find themselves forced to destroy the evidence of their pre-
sumed wrongdoing."
36
Evidence from drug treatment centers support the find-
ings of the AMA and USGAO. For example, a survey of
treatment programs in New York City revealed that fifty-four
percent deny treatment to all pregnant women, and eighty-
seven percent said they would refuse to treat a pregnant
woman on Medicaid that was addicted to cocaine. There-
fore, opponents argue that unless adequate drug treatment
centers are available for pregnant women, coercive actions
against drug-addicted pregnant mothers are unjustified.38
C. Three Models for Prenatal Abuse Prosecutions
1. Introduction
Prosecutions for prenatal substance abuse across the
country have yielded extremely disparate results because
case law has failed to define the legal status of a fetus in re-
lation to a pregnant woman. 9 However, successful prosecu-
tions are based, in large part, upon one of three potential
models for the fetus-mother relationship. The three models
are described in detail below.
2. Mother and Fetus Possess Conflicting Rights
Under the first model, the fetus and mother are viewed
as two distinct beings that hold competing and often hostile
interests.4 Thus, the woman is viewed simply as a container
35. Id. at 572 (citing American Medical Ass'n, Legal Interventions During
Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for Poten-
tially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663 (1990)).
36. Warren, supra note 22, at 295-96.
37. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 605 (citing Born Hooked: Confronting the
Impact of Prenatal Substance Abuse: Hearing Before the House Select Comm. on
Children, Youth, and Families, 101st Cong. 110, 112 (1989)).
38. Warren, supra note 22, at 295-96.
39. Nelson, supra note 10, at 315.
40. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 576.
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used by the fetus until it comes to term.4 Because this
framework creates a conflict between women's liberty and the
promotion of healthy babies, Dawn Johnsen, the Legal Direc-
tor for the National Abortion Rights League, has labeled it
the "adversarial model.""2 In describing this model, she
states, "[a]dversarial policies approach the woman and the
fetus she carries as distinct legal entities having adverse in-
terests, and assume that the government's role is to protect
the fetus from the woman.""'
Many theorists have argued that the notion of fetal
rights is a misnomer." These advocates maintain that view-
ing the rights of the fetus and mother as completely distinct
allows the state to vindicate the fetus's rights without ac-
counting for the mother's simultaneous rights to privacy, lib-
erty or bodily integrity. " For example, Lynn Paltrow, Direc-
tor of Special Litigation for the Center of Reproductive Law
and Policy in New York argues, "[c]reating fetal personhood
necessarily means the destruction of women's person-
hood .... The problem is, there is no logical limit. This
whole discussion absolutely makes the woman, her body, her
flesh irrelevant."46 Since pregnant women must make count-
less daily decisions that, to varying degrees, affect the likeli-
hood of optimal fetal development, 7 there must be a logical
limit to governmental intrusion.48 Therefore, the adversarial
41. Id. at 570.
42. Id. at 576.
43. Id. at 571. Thus, the adversarial approach cautions restraint since it
provides the state with a powerful means of controlling women's behavior dur-
ing pregnancy, thereby threatening women's fundamental rights. Id.
44. See, eg., Dawn Johnsen, The Creation of Fetal Rights: Conflicts with
Women's Constitutional Rights to Liberty, Privacy, and Equal Protection, 95
YALE L. J. 599 (1986); Nelson, supra note 10, at 304; Lyle Denniston, Abortion,
Fetus Rights on Legal Collision Course: Protections for Unborn Head Test in
Florida, BALTIMORE SuN, Nov. 4, 1996, at Al (quoting Lynn M. Paltrow, direc-
tor of special litigation for the Center of Reproductive Law and Policy in New
York).
45. Nelson, supra note 10, at 304.
46. Denniston, supra note 44.
47. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 998. For example,
a pregnant woman must decide whether to drink coffee, continue working,
drink alcohol and exercise.
48. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 607. Because policies premised on the ad-
versarial model only burden the liberty of women, and not men, important sex
equality concerns are raised. The Supreme Court ruled, in UAW v. Johnson
Controls, 499 U.S. 187, 198-99 (1991), that sex discrimination exists when men
and women are similarly situated, yet the government singles out only women
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view remains problematic because the state may punish or
sanction actions that cause minor or negligible harm to the
fetus, regardless of the amount of impingement on the
woman's interests. 9 A woman's interest in her own bodily in-
tegrity can be easily trumped by the fetus's interests since
the two beings are viewed as distinct rather than interre-
lated.5"
3. The Fetus Has No Rights Until Birth
The second model, at the other extreme, views the
mother and child as completely indistinguishable from one
another such that the fetus is considered only a part of the
mother with no rights of its own.5 Under this framework,
the fetus is given no rights independent of its mother's until
its birth. Therefore, in theory a woman could do anything to
her body without regard to her fetus.52 Although a woman
should be accorded a degree of discretion in deciding how to
conduct herself during pregnancy, she most likely will not
completely ignore the potential for life represented by the fe-
tus.53 Therefore, this model does not sufficiently depict real-
ity and, thus, is not adhered to by either side of the debate.
4. Mother and Fetus Union
The third and final model, taking the middle ground ap-
proach, views the mother and fetus as a union.54 Lawrence
Nelson, a noted bioethicist and lawyer, describes this union
for penalties and restrictions. In Johnson Controls, an employment policy ex-
cluded women from jobs involving exposure to lead because of possible harm to
their fetuses, even though men's exposure to lead could also damage their
sperm and lead to diminished birth outcomes. Id. at 192. Likewise, punitive
actions aimed at women who use alcohol or drugs discriminate against women
since evidence supports that men can also cause harm to their sperm and, thus,
future children by using alcohol and drugs. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 607.
Therefore, one must closely examine the disparate treatment of men and
women in this context to determine to what extent prosecuting fetal abuse con-
stitutes impermissible sex stereotypes about a woman's role in childbearing.
Id.
49. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 606-07; see also supra notes 22-28 and ac-
companying text for arguments that a woman who decides to carry a fetus to
term waives all maternal rights such that she cannot engage in any behavior
which may potentially harm the fetus.
50. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 607.
51. Id. at 600-01.
52. Id. at 601.
53. Id. at 571.
54. Nelson, supra note 10, at 302-04.
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by stating, "[a] pregnant woman and her fetus constitute a
union in the sense that they are two genetically different
human entities who are joined together for a period of time.
They are a union, yet simultaneously distinguishable as two
different entities who are intimately joined."" He supports
this paradigm from a biological perspective, which holds that
a fetus does not exist in the abstract or on its own, rather, it
exists only inside the womb of a woman." Dawn Johnsen,
who labels this the "facilitative model," argues that this
model "recognizes that women who bear children share the
government's objective of promoting healthy births but
that... [w]omen inevitably must make numerous decisions
that require them to balance varying and uncertain risks to
fetal development against competing demands and interests
in their lives."57
D. Legal Treatment of Conflicting Maternal and Fetal
Interests
The United States Supreme Court has yet to review any
prosecutions of fetal abuse under child abuse statutes that
have extended the meaning of "child" to include "fetus" for
purposes of prosecuting prenatal drug abuse.58 However,
abortion jurisprudence is instructive because both fetal abuse
prosecutions and abortion concern the right of a woman to
make autonomous decisions about her body during preg-
nancy. In addition, abortion jurisprudence and fetal abuse
cases both involve a state interest in protecting the life and
health of the fetus, which must be balanced against maternal
privacy and decisional rights.59 Roe v. Wade6" and Planned
55. Id. at 303.
56. Id.
57. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 571.
58. See, e.g., In re Valerie D, 613 A.2d 748 (Conn. 1992) (holding that a child
abuse statute does not apply to an unborn fetus and that the lack of a parent-
child relationship cannot be used to terminate parental rights when the lack of
a relationship was a direct result of the fact that the child was in foster care
from birth). The Connecticut Supreme Court explicitly stated that the prosecu-
tion would not withstand constitutional scrutiny. Id. Cf. Whitner v. South
Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997) (refusing to examine the constitutionality
of its holding by citing procedural defects in the pleading that precluded it from
having to make such considerations).
59. See Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
60. 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a the right to chose an abortion).
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Parenthood v. Casey,6 embody the facilitative approach to fe-
tal rights and thus provide a framework for balancing the
state's interest in protecting the potential life and health of
the fetus against the maternal privacy rights.62
1. The Right to Privacy in Reproductive Decision-
Making
The Supreme Court first articulated the right to privacy
in reproductive decision-making in Griswold v. Connecticut,"
when the Court struck down a law that prohibited married
couples from using contraception by recognizing that certain
intimate decisions deserve constitutional protection.64 Later
cases elaborated on this right to privacy to include freedom of
personal choice in matters of marriage, procreation, contra-
ception, child rearing, education and family life.65 More im-
portantly, the Court has continually upheld the "the right of
the individual, married or single, to be free from unwar-
ranted governmental intrusion into matters so fundamen-
tally affecting a person as the decision whether to bear or be-
get a child."66 The Court further stated,
These matters, involving the most intimate and personal
choices a person may make in a lifetime, choices central to
personal dignity and autonomy, are central to the liberty
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. At the very
heart of the liberty is the right to define one's own concept
of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of the mys-
tery of human life.
61. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (affirming the right
to an abortion as established in Roe, but adopting an undue burden standard
for potential regulations).
62. See infra Part II.D.2-3.
63. 381 U.S. 479 (1965) (establishing the right of married couples to use
contraception).
64. Id. at 485-86.
65. See Moore v. City of East Cleveland, 431 U.S. 494 (1977) (striking down
an ordinance that restricted the ability of certain relatives to live together); Roe
v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (right to choose whether to terminate a preg-
nancy); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967) (right to choose one's spouse);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (right to procreate); Pierce v. Society
of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510 (1925) (right to select the schooling of children under
one's control); Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923) (right to determine the
language taught to one's children).
66. Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972) (extending the right to use con-
traception to unmarried individuals).
67. Casey, 505 U.S. at 851.
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2. Abortion Jurisprudence: A Framework for Analyzing
Maternal Privacy Rights and the State's Interest in
Potential Life
Roe v. Wade6' and its progeny have provided the frame-
work for analyzing conflicts between maternal privacy rights
and the state's interest in protecting the fetus and should
constitute binding precedent regarding the legal status of a
fetus in other contexts such as fetal abuse. 9 Roe, the land-
mark case making abortions in the first two trimesters legal,
further solidified the right to privacy in reproductive deci-
sion-making by recognizing the right to an abortion based on
a right to privacy founded in the Fourteenth Amendment's
concept of personal liberty. ° After specifically stating that
"person as used in the Fourteenth Amendment does not in-
clude the unborn,"7 the Court nonetheless noted that the
state does have an important and legitimate interest in pre-
serving and protecting the health of a pregnant woman and
another important interest in protecting the potentiality of
human life.72 According to Roe, they are separate and dis-
tinct; each grows substantially as the woman approaches
term.73 In order to determine what amount of state regula-
tion is appropriate, the Court expressed that where funda-
68. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
69. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 997. There are dif-
ferences between the state's interest in fetal abuse and abortion cases to the
extent that, in the abortion context, the state's interest is the protection of po-
tential life; whereas, in the fetal abuse cases, the state's interest is in protecting
the potential child's quality of life. Id.
70. Roe, 410 U.S. 113. Many proponents of fetal abuse statutes urge that
abortion law is not applicable since the right accorded in Roe is the right to be
free to make decisions concerning whether or not to terminate a pregnancy;
whereas fetal abuse cases focus on decisions regarding how to conduct one's life
during pregnancy. Id. "In the fetal abuse context, the state's interests are not
preservation of the mother's health and the protection of potential life against
the intentional termination, but the enhancement of the born child's quality of
life through protection of the fetus from reckless or negligent harm." Sharon
Elizabeth Rush, Prenatal Care Taking: Limits of State Intervention With and
Without Roe, 39 U. FLA. L. REV. 55, 64 (1987) (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113
(1973)). Thus, it is argued that once a woman decides to carry a pregnancy to
term, she has exercised the right protected in Roe. Robertson, supra note 23, at
411. However, abortion jurisprudence is applicable in fetal abuse cases to the
extent that they both involve a state interest in protecting the life and health of
the fetus which must be balanced against maternal privacy and decisional
rights. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 997.
71. Roe, 410 U.S. at 158.
72. Id. at 154-55, 159.
73. Id. at 162-63.
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mental rights are involved, regulations limiting these rights
may only be justified by "compelling state interests," and that
legislative enactments must be narrowly tailored to express
only the legitimate state interest at stake.74 Thus, the Court
in Roe defined a trimester system to reflect the state's vary-
ing interest in the mother and fetus.75 The trimester system,
as articulated in Roe, is as follows:
(a) During the first trimester, the state may not regulate
abortions, such that the decision whether to abort must be
left to the woman and to the medical judgment of the
woman's physician.
(b) From the end of the first trimester to the point of fetal
viability, a state may regulate the procedure in ways that
are reasonably related to the state's interest in preserving
and protecting the health of the pregnant woman.
(c) Finally, from the point of fetal viability, defined as be-
ginning in the third trimester, a state's interest in pro-
moting its interest in the potentiality of human life may, if
it chooses, regulate, and even proscribe, abortion except
where it is necessary, in appropriate medical judgment,
for the preservation of the life or health of the mother.6
Thus, the Court recognized both maternal privacy rights
and the state interest in protecting potential life, but engaged
in a balancing test to determine if and when the interest in
protecting potential life becomes compelling.77 The Court de-
cided that the right to terminate pregnancy was not absolute,
and thus acknowledged some state regulation as appropri-
ate.8
In Planned Parenthood v. Casey,9 the most recent Su-
74. Id. at 155. The Court in Roe explained that case law has established
that where certain fundamental rights are involved, regulations curtailing
these rights must be justified by a "compelling state interest." See Kramer v.
Union Free Sch. Dist., 395 U.S. 621, 627 (1969); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S.
618, 634 (1969); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963). In addition,
when dealing with these fundamental rights, legislative enactments must be
narrowly drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at stake. See
Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S., 479, 485 (1965); Aptheker v. Secretary of
State, 378 U.S. 500, 508 (1964); Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 307-08
(1940).
75. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163-64.
76. Id. at 164-65.
77. Id. at 162-63.
78. Id. at 154.
79. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
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preme Court decision in the area of abortion and reproductive
rights, the Court reaffirmed the central holding of Roe which
the Court in Casey viewed as having three parts: (1) a recog-
nition of a woman's right to an abortion without undue inter-
ference from the state before fetal viability; ° (2) a confirma-
tion of the State's power to restrict post-viability abortions as
long as there is an exception for pregnancies which endanger
a woman's life or health;81 and (3) the principle that the State
has a legitimate interest in the woman's health and potenti-
ality of life from the outset of pregnancy.
2
However, since the trimester framework was not consid-
ered part of Roe's central holding, the Court rejected it.83 In
doing so, the Court in Casey reasoned that the trimester
framework was enacted to ensure that a woman's right to
choose an abortion did not become subordinate to the State's
interest in protecting fetal life.84 However, the trimester
framework had the practical effect of prohibiting all State
regulation in the first two trimesters.85 The Court noted that
the right to terminate a pregnancy does not necessarily pro-
hibit the state from taking steps to ensure that the choice is
thoughtful and informed.8 Thus, because the trimester
framework had the effect of forbidding any regulations before
viability, the Court rejected the trimester framework in favor
of an undue burden standard which allows the state to im-
pose only those regulations that do not cause undue interfer-
ence with a woman's right to an abortion."
The Court in Casey described the undue burden standard
as follows: "the very notion that the State has a substantial
interest in potential life leads to the conclusion that not all
regulations must be deemed unwarranted. Not all burdens
on the right to decide whether to terminate a pregnancy will
be undue."88 In essence, an undue burden exists if the pur-
pose or effect of a state regulation results in placing substan-
tial obstacles in the path of a woman seeking to abort a non-
80. Id. at 846.
81. Id.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 873.
84. See id. at 873-76.
85. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 876 (1992).
86. Id. at 877-78.
87. Id. at 876.
88. Id.
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viable fetus.89 "Regulations which do no more than create a
structural mechanism by which the State, or parent or
guardian of a minor, may express profound respect for the
life of the unborn are permitted, if they are not a substantial
obstacle to the woman's exercise of the right to choose."9"
Thus, as long as the proposed regulation fosters informed de-
cision-making, it will be upheld.9
Although Roe and Casey embody the facilitative model,
prosecutions for fetal abuse continue to employ the adver-
sarial model of fetal rights. Because the Supreme Court has
not yet decided any of these cases, it is not clear whether Roe
and Casey should be binding. It is, therefore, important to
examine fetal abuse prosecution cases to illustrate that they
do in fact violate the union of rights established in Roe and
Casey.
3. Cases Prosecuted Using the Adversarial Model
Criminal sanctions in the context of drug use or neglect
during pregnancy have gained popular support.92 In 1994,
twelve states expanded their definitions of child abuse to in-
clude fetal drug exposure.93 Many lower courts have read
protection for fetuses into existing state civil child neglect
statutes, thus allowing the state to take custody of newborn
children who have been neglected in utero.94 In an extreme
case, a woman who had been using cocaine was detained for
three weeks during her pregnancy in a drug treatment center
to protect the health of her fetus.9" The state appellate court
held that her rights were not violated by the "protective cus-
tody" since only the fetus was ordered to be detained.96
Courts, prosecutors, and other government entities
across the nation recently have policed a broad range of
women's activities during pregnancy.97 Most of these prose-
cutions have attempted to define the fetus as a legal person
89. Id. at 877.
90. Id.
91. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
92. See infra notes 91-106 and accompanying text.
93. Steinbock, supra note 1, at 280.
94. In re Baby X, 293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980); In re Smith, 492
N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fam. Ct. 1985); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio C.P. 1986).
95. Denniston, supra note 42, at Al.
96. Id.
97. See infra notes 82-103 and accompanying text.
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with rights in conflict with the mother's.98 For example, an
appellate court in Michigan held that a child born with dis-
colored teeth, whose mother had negligently used tetracycline
during pregnancy, could sue his mother for prenatal injuries,
if it was determined that she had failed to act as a
"reasonable" pregnant woman.99
Women have also been charged with child abuse by
prosecutors interpreting child abuse statutes to include a fe-
tus.'00 As a result, women have been charged with child ne-
glect or abuse for engaging in both legal and illegal activities
which have caused harm to the fetus.'0 ' For example, a
woman in California was prosecuted for allegedly causing her
son to suffer severe brain damage as a result of her own blood
loss during delivery.0 2 She was prosecuted under a statute
requiring parents to provide their children with clothing,
food, shelter and medical attention.'3 The prosecution al-
leged that the woman could have avoided the harm to her
child if she had followed her doctor's advice and sought medi-
cal attention as soon as she had begun bleeding vaginally.""
Ultimately, the judge ruled that the statute could not be used
to prosecute a woman for otherwise lawful activities during
pregnancy.105 However, such cases have not prevented prose-
cutors around the country from prosecuting women under
statutes that were most likely not intended to criminalize
otherwise legal conduct during pregnancy."'
Even more prevalent are cases involving illegal sub-
stance abuse by pregnant women.' 7 As previously stated, a
98. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 576-77.
99. Id. (citing Grodin v. Grodin, 301 N.W.2d 869, 870-71 (Mich. Ct. App.
1980)).
100. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 994 (citing People v.
Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987) (charging a pregnant
woman with child neglect for not seeking medical assistance immediately after
she began vaginal bleeding during pregnancy)); see also infra Part II.D.4.
101. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 994; see, e.g., People
v. Stewart, No. M508197 (Cal. Mun. Ct. Feb. 26, 1987) (charging a woman with
child neglect for not following the doctor's orders).
102. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 994.
103. Id. at 994 n.1 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 270 (West 1988)).
104. Id.
105. Id. at 994-95.
106. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 577.
107. Id.; see, e.g., Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997);
Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992); In re Ruiz, 500 N.E.2d 935 (Ohio
C.P. 1986); In re Smith, 492 N.Y.S.2d 331 (N.Y. Fain. Ct. 1985); In re Baby X,
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woman who engages in illegal substance abuse or other ille-
gal conduct can be held accountable under applicable crimi-
nal statutes. °8 However, commentators stress that women
should not be singled out for special prosecutions and higher
penalties solely because they are pregnant at the time of drug
109
use.
For example, prosecutions for delivering drugs to a minor
during the period of time the baby is born, but still connected
by the umbilical cord, are a dramatic example of using a
woman's pregnant status in order to convict her of a more se-
rious crime."0  In July 1989, Jennifer Johnson became the
first woman to be convicted of delivering cocaine to her child
through the umbilical cord. She was sentenced to a one year
rehabilitation program and fourteen years probation."' The
alternative was to charge Jennifer Johnson with possession
of cocaine. However, by waiting for her baby to be born,
Johnson was convicted of delivery to a minor which carries a
much harsher sentence. In addition, the prosecutors by-
passed the crucial issue of whether a fetus should be granted
the status of a child by waiting until the baby was born and
yet still connected to the mother."2 Therefore, this prosecu-
tion remains troubling since it avoids an issue that needs to
be resolved by higher courts.
4. Whitner v. South Carolina: The Highest Court Holds
That a Fetus Constitutes a Person for Purposes of
Child Abuse Statutes
In July 1996, the South Carolina Supreme Court became
293 N.W.2d 736 (Mich. Ct. App. 1980).
108. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 579.
109. Id.
110. Johnson v. State, 578 So. 2d 419 (Fla. 1991), decision quashed by, 602
So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992) (reversing Johnson's conviction).
111. Id.
112. Steinbock, supra note 1, at 279. However, these prosecutions remain
dubious because the intent required for a criminal conviction under these stat-
utes is usually absent, as it would be difficult to establish that a pregnant
woman intends to deliver drugs to her fetus in the same sense that a drug
pusher intends to deliver drugs. Id. If she is aware of the risks to her fetus but
ignores the risks, she is most likely guilty of reckless endangerment. Id. Even
so, most women are probably not even guilty of reckless endangerment since
they are ignorant of the extent of the risk of drug use. Id. Thus, a woman ig-
norant of the risks does not intentionally or recklessly harm her baby, but,
rather, negligently allows her not-yet-born child to be exposed to harm as a re-
sult of her drug use. Id.
1270 [Vol. 38
1998] PRENATAL DRUG ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 1271
the highest court to uphold a conviction of criminal child ne-
glect for causing a baby to be born with cocaine metabolites
by reason of the mother's ingestion of crack cocaine during
the third trimester of her pregnancy."' On April 20, 1992,
Cornelia Whitner pled guilty to criminal child neglect under
section 20-7-50 of the South Carolina Code14 for causing her
baby to be born with cocaine metabolites in its system be-
cause of her use of crack cocaine during the third trimester of
her pregnancy."' The circuit court convicted Whitner and
sentenced her to eight years in prison."6 Although Whitner
did not initially appeal her conviction, she later filed a peti-
tion for Post Conviction Relief ("PCR") in which she plead
lack of subject matter jurisdiction to accept her guilty plea
and ineffective counsel for her lawyer's failure to advise her
that the statute under which she was being convicted may
not apply to prenatal drug use. 17 The petition was granted
and the State appealed."8 In July 1996, the South Carolina
Supreme Court reversed the circuit court and upheld the
conviction, thus becoming the first state court of last resort to
uphold a conviction for prenatal substance abuse under a
criminal child abuse statute by holding that a fetus is a
"child" for the purpose of child abuse statutes."9 On rehear-
ing, the court again affirmed Whitner's conviction. 120
113. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
114. Id. at 778. The court quoted the South Carolina Code, S.C. CODE ANN. §
20-7-50 (Law. Co-op. 1985):
Any person having the legal custody of any child or helpless person,
who shall, without lawful excuse, refuse or neglect to provide, as de-
fined in § 20-7-490, the proper care and attention for such child or
helpless person, so that the life, health or comfort of such child or
helpless person is endangered or is likely to be endangered, shall be
guilty of a misdemeanor and shall be punished within the discretion of
the circuit court.
Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 778.
115. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d 778-79.
116. Id. at 779.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997)
120. Id.. The Supreme Court of South Carolina originally decided the case
on July 15, 1996. Whitner v. South Carolina, No. 24468, 1996 WL 393164 (S.C.
July 15, 1996). However, the court granted a petition for rehearing on October
22, 1997 to hear Whitner's constitutional arguments, which had been improp-
erly raised with the PCR. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C.
1997). As such, the opinion filed in July 1996 was withdrawn and replaced with
the opinions issued on October 22, 1997. Id. The two opinions are substan-
tively the same; however, the latter opinion includes a disposition of constitu-
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The South Carolina Supreme Court relied on its previous
holdings in wrongful death actions and murder charges
which recognized that viable fetuses are persons holding cer-
tain legal rights and privileges. 2' For example, the court ex-
plained that it had recognized a wrongful death action in
Hall v. Murphy 22 for an infant who died as a result of inju-
ries sustained prenatally after viability. 23 In that case, the
court held there was no "medical or other basis" to assume
that a fetus has no separate being apart from the mother
and, thus, a fetus capable of independent life apart from its
mother is a person.'24 In addition, the court pointed to cases
in which it recognized the crime of feticide with respect to vi-
able fetuses, 5 and actions for injuries inflicted on a viable fe-
tus which caused the fetus to be born dead,2 6 to conclude that
viable fetuses are persons holding legal rights and privi-
leges.
127
The Whitner court distinguished several cases in other
states where the state refused to prosecute for fetal abuse by
pointing out that many of the cases which declined to con-
strue "person" to mean "viable fetus" for purposes of child
abuse statutes, similarly did not construe the word person in
a criminal statute to include fetus (viable or not). 28 For ex-
ample, in Reyes v. Superior Court,'29 the court of appeals
tional issues raised by Whitner. See id.
121. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d 777, 779 (S.C. 1997).
122. 113 S.E.2d 790 (S.C. 1960).
123. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 779.
124. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780 (citing Hall v. Murphy, 113 S.E.2d 790, 793
(S.C. 1960)).
125. Id. (citing State v. Horne, 319 S.E.2d 703 (S.C. 1984) (holding that a
man who stabbed his wife who was nine months pregnant, resulting in the
'child's" death, was guilty of feticide)).
126. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 780 (S.C. 1997) (citing
Fowler v. Woodward, 138 S.E.2d 42 (S.C. 1964) (holding that once the concept
of an unborn, viable child as a person is accepted, a cause of action for tortious
injury to such a child arises immediately upon the infliction of injury)).
127. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 780.
128. Commonwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280, 281 (Ky. 1993).
129. Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912 (Ct. App. 1977). Margaret
Valasquez Reyes was charged with two counts of felony child endangerment for
using heroine during pregnancy and subsequently giving birth to twin boys ad-
dicted to heroine. Id. at 912. The court held that the word "child" as used in
section 273(a)(1) of the California Penal Code was not intended to refer to an
unborn child and that petitioner's prenatal conduct did not constitute felonious
child endangering within the contemplation of the statute. Id. at 913. Section
273(a)(1) of the California Penal Code provides in pertinent part: "Any person
who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bodily harm or
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noted that California law does not recognize a fetus as a
"human being" within the purview of the state murder and
manslaughter statutes; thus, it was improper to find the fe-
tus was a "child" for purposes of the felonious child endan-
germent statute. Likewise, the court in Whitner cited Com-
monwealth v. Welch 130 in which the Kentucky Supreme Court
refused to extend a child endangerment statute to prenatal
conduct specifically because Kentucky law had not construed
the word person in a criminal statute to include a fetus.'
Even though the South Carolina Supreme Court could
distinguish itself from states which do not recognize actions
for fetal manslaughter or murder, it still had to distinguish
itself from Massachusetts case law since Massachusetts rec-
ognizes actions for fetal murder, but did not allow a prosecu-
tion for fetal abuse under a child abuse statute.32 Massachu-
setts, like South Carolina, recognizes wrongful death actions
on behalf of a viable fetus injured in utero and subsequently
born dead, 133 and permits homicide prosecutions of third par-
ties who kill viable fetuses.3  However, in Commonwealth v.
Pelligrini,3' the Massachusetts state court held that a
mother pregnant with a viable fetus is not criminally liable
for transmission of cocaine to the fetus because a viable fetus
death.... having the care or custody of any child,... willfully causes or per-
mits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or health is endan-
gered, is punishable .... " CAL. PENAL CODE § 273(a)(1) (West 1977).
In support of its holding, the court noted in Reyes that the unborn child has
been held not to be a 'human being" within the contemplation of murder stat-
utes. Keeler v. Superior Court, 470 P.2d 617 (Cal. 1970). In addition, an un-
born child has not been included in the court's interpretation of 'minor child" in
the failure to provide statute. People v. Yates, 114 Cal. App. Supp. 782, 785
(Cal. App. Dep't Super. Ct. 1931). Finally, an unborn child has not been held to
be a person as the word is used in the Fourteenth Amendment to the United
States Constitution. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 158 (1973).
130. 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993).
131. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d 777, 782 (S.C. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v.
Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993)).
132. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No 87970, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1990).
133. Mone v. Greyhound Lines, Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975)
(establishing a wrongful death action on behalf of viable fetuses injured in utero
and subsequently born dead).
134. See Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989) (holding
that a viable fetus is a person for purposes of common law crime of murder);
Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984) (holding that a fetus is a
person for purposes of vehicular homicide statute).
135. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No 87970, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1990).
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is not a person within the meaning of the state's illegal sub-
stance distribution statute.'36 The Pelligrini court reasoned
that its state tort and criminal actions for fetal harm
"accorded legal rights to the unborn only where the mothers'
or parents' interest in the potentiality of life, not the state's
interest, are sought to be vindicated."137 Under this rationale,
the viable fetus lacks rights of its own that deserve vindica-
tion. 1"8 The Whitner court refused to recognize this rationale
and instead argued that South Carolina's tort and criminal
actions for fetal harm rested on the state's interest-rather
than the mother's interest-in vindicating the life of the vi-
able fetus.
19
Finally, the Court to Whitner's constitutional argu-
ments. 140 Whitner argued that prosecuting he for using co-
caine during pregnancy burdens her right to privacy or her
right to carry her pregnancy to term. 141 The Court held that
her prosecution did not implicate any of Whitner's fundamen-
tal rights because cocaine use, whether or not during preg-
nancy, is not a right since it is always illegal. 142 Therefore,
the Court stated, "[i]f the State wishes to impose additional
penalties on pregnancy women who engage in the already il-
legal conduct because of the effect the conduct has on the vi-
able fetus, it may do So." 1 4 3 Thus, Court argued that the im-
position of an additional penalty does not burden a woman's
right to carry her pregnancy to term; but rather simply rec-
ognizes that a third party is harmed. 144
5. Cases Which Have Declined to Extend Child to
Include Fetus
On the other hand, several decisions have rejected the
idea that a fetus is a child for purposes of child abuse stat-
utes and, thus, have held that criminal conduct before the
birth of the child does not give rise to criminal prosecution
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d 777, 782-83 (S.C. 1997) (citing Commonwealth v.
Pelligrini, No 87970, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990)).
139. Id.
140. Id. at 784.
141. Id. at 785.
142. Id. at 786.
143. Id.
144. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 786 (S.C. 1997).
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under state child abuse/endangerment or drug distribution
statutes. 14  Most significantly, in 1992, the Connecticut Su-
preme Court reversed a judgment which terminated the pa-
rental rights of the mother and granted custody to the state
based on the mother's prenatal conduct of injecting cocaine. 146
The action was brought under section 45a-717 (f)(2) of the
Connecticut General Statutes which provides, in pertinent
part, that the court may approve a petition for termination of
parental rights "if it finds, upon clear and convincing evi-
dence that.., the child has been denied, by reason of an act
or acts of parental commission or omission, the care, guid-
ance or control necessary for [the child's] physical, educa-
tional, moral or emotional well-being."14' The court had to
address the issue of whether the legislature intended this
statutory language to contemplate the termination of paren-
tal rights based on prenatal conduct. 48 The court examined
the legislative intent behind the statute and concluded that
"until birth, Valerie was not a "child" within the meaning of §
45a-717 (f)(2) and, therefore, the "act... of parental commis-
sion" that took place before that moment cannot be consid-
ered to be parental conduct that "denied [her]... the
care ... necessary for [her] physical ... well-being."1 49 Thus,
the court concluded that the legislature did not contemplate
that a petition for termination of parental rights could be
based on prenatal drug use by the mother.'
145. See, Commonwealth v. Kemp, 643 A.2d 705 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1994); Com-
monwealth v. Welch, 864 S.W.2d 280 (Ky. 1993); Johnson v. State, 602 So.2d
1288 (Fla. 1992); State v. Gray, 584 N.E.2d 710 (Ohio 1992); State v. Luster,
419 S.E.2d 32 (Ga. Ct. App. 1992), cert. denied, (Ga. June 4, 1992); State v. Car-
ter, 602 So. 2d 995 (Fla. Ct. App. 1992); People v. Hardy, 468 N.W.2d 50 (Mich.
Ct. App), app. denied, 471 N.W.2d 619 (Mich. 1991); State v. Gethers, 585 So.
2d 1140 (Fla. Ct. App. 1991); Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970, slip op.
(Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990); Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912
(Ct. App. 1977).
146. In re Valerie D, 613 A.2d 748, 759 (Conn. 1992) (holding that child
abuse statute was not applicable to unborn child and that lack of parent-child
relationship cannot be used to terminate parental rights when the lack of a re-
lationship was a direct result of the fact that the child was in foster care from
birth).
147. Id. at 759 (citing CoNN. GEN. STAT. § 45a-717(f)(2) (1990)).
148. Id. at 765.
149. Id. at 760.
150. Id. at 765.
SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
B. State Reluctance to Intrude into Lives of Others
Abortion jurisprudence has consistently established that
maternal health outweighs concerns for fetal health through-
out pregnancy.15' For example, in Thornburgh v. American
College of Obstetrics and Gynecology,5 ' the Supreme Court
struck down a statute that did not clearly make maternal
health concerns a greater priority than fetal health. Fur-
thermore, in Roe v. Wade, the Court prohibited states from
proscribing post-viability abortions if they are "necessary to
preserve the life of the mother."5 '
The State has repeatedly declined to intrude into the
lives or bodies of one individual for the sake of another, even
when the individual's life is at stake. " In fact, our legal sys-
tem has typically refused to force one person to help another
even when doing so would save the other from injury or
death.'55 For example, there have been two reported cases
where individuals unsuccessfully sought court orders to com-
pel one person to undergo a medical procedure for the benefit
of another.'56 In McFall v. Shimp,157 a terminally ill man
sought a court order to compel his first cousin to undergo
bone marrow testing and donation if compatible.'58 Even
though a bone marrow transplant was the plaintiffs only
hope for survival and the procedure would most likely not
cause harm to the cousin, the court refused to order the in-
trusion since establishing a legally enforceable duty to un-
dergo bodily invasion for another's benefit "would defeat the
sanctity of the individual, and would impose a rule which
would know no limits, and one could not imagine where the
line would be drawn."159
Similarly, in Curran v. Bosze, 160 a father sought a court
order to compel his ex-girlfriend and mother of twin three
151. See supra Part II.D.3 and accompanying text.
152. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 476 U.S.
747 (1986).
153. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
154. Nelson, supra note 10, at 311.
155. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 583.
156. Nelson, supra note 10, at 311.
157. 10 Pa. D & C.2d 90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978).
158. Nelson, supra note 10, at 311 (citing McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D & C.2d
90 (Allegheny County Ct. 1978)).
159. Id. at 311-12 (citing McFall v. Shimp, 10 Pa. D & C.2d 90 (Allegheny
County Ct. 1978)).
160. 566 N.E.2d 1319 (Ill. 1990).
1276 [Vol. 38
1998] PRENATAL DRUG ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 1277
year old boys, to be tested as a potential bone marrow donor
for the benefit of their thirteen year old son who was dying of
leukemia. 6' The court held that the father could not force
her or the twin boys to undergo testing even though it may
save the life of his son. 62 These cases illustrate that impos-
ing invasive and life-threatening medical interventions upon
competent yet unconsenting adults is viewed as unconscion-
able even if done for the benefit of another individual.'
III. STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
The outcome of prosecutions for prenatal drug abuse
rests on the legal status accorded to the fetus and relative
weight given to the mother's privacy interest relative to the
fetus or state. However, the law has not clearly established
the relationship between the mother and fetus."M As a direct
result, prosecutions of prenatal drug abuse have been con-
ducted on a case-by-case basis, yielding highly unpredictable
decisions which rely on questionable rationales and tread
heavily on an area that has traditionally been considered pri-
vate-namely, the bodies and private lives of its citizens.'
For example, as Whitner currently stands, nothing in the
reasoning of the case would prevent the state from prosecut-
ing a woman for child neglect for lawful activities, such as
smoking or drinking coffee, during pregnancy as long as it
had the effect of endangering the life of the fetus. In essence,
such reasoning reduces women to fetal containers for whom
the state can regulate both lawful and unlawful activities
during pregnancy. Therefore, many self-destructive or negli-
gent actions taken by pregnant women could be the basis of
charges for child abuse.
The prevalence of prosecutions based on purely legal ac-
tivities should caution restraint in using any punitive frame-
work based on granting the fetus its own legal status since it
allows clearly inapplicable statutes to be used to regulate a
161. Id. at 312 (citing Court Blocks Forced Marrow Tests, S.F. CHRON., Sept.
29, 1990, at AS; Boy in Leukemia Case Dies - He Lost Supreme Court Ruling,
S.F. CHRON., Nov. 20, 1990, at B6) [hereinafter Leukemia Case Dies].
162. Id. (citing Leukemia Case Dies, supra note 161, at B6.)
163. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 583; Nelson, supra note 10, at 312.
164. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood v. Casey 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v.
Wade, 410 U.S. 113; see also supra Part II.D.3 for a discussion of disparities in
criminal law which fail to address the legal status of fetuses.
165. Nelson, supra note 10, at 305.
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woman's conduct merely because she is pregnant."' There-
fore, to prevent relegating women to fetal containers and de-
velop a workable framework for prosecuting prenatal drug
abuse, the status of the fetus in relation to its mother must
be clarified.
IV. ANALYSIS
Drug use during pregnancy unquestionably causes sev-
eral problems for the child and, later, for society. 67 Women
can be prosecuted under generally applicable criminal laws
which prohibit any individual from engaging in illegal be-
havior. However, women should not be singled out and sub-
jected to special prosecutions and additional penalties solely
because they were pregnant at the time they engaged in ille-
gal conduct such as drug use. '68
A. Whitner Violates Casey and Roe Which Represent the
Facilitative Model
Prosecutions of fetal abuse have not followed the facilita-
tive model because extending "child" to include a "fetus," cre-
ates fetal rights which are in conflict with the mother's.'69
Therefore, prosecutions which have accorded the fetus its
own legal rights equivalent to that of a child ignore the si-
multaneous interests of the mother in her own privacy and
bodily integrity.'7 °  Thus, such prosecutions violate' the
framework for balancing maternal and fetal interests as es-
tablished in Roe and Casey.'7'
Criminalizing conduct harmful to a woman's own fetus in
utero has two detrimental effects, both of which stem from
viewing the fetus and mother as distinct.' 2 First, the adver-
sarial model results in treating women as fetal containers,
rather than thinking and feeling beings.'7 Second, by recog-
nizing fetal rights in opposition to the mother's, fetal abuse
legislation forces women to see their fetuses as things that
166. See supra Part II.C.
167. Stovall, supra note 1, at 1265.
168. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 579.
169. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
170. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 581-82.
171. See sup'ra Part II.D.
172. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1009.
173. Id. at 1010.
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curtail their legal rights.74 Fetal abuse laws threaten preg-
nant women by making pregnancy a legally precarious situa-
tion, potentially fostering hostility between mother and
child.175  Thus, by employing the adversarial model, courts
have not only ignored established legal precedent regarding
the status of the fetus,'176 but also have most likely violated
Roe and Casey in three respects. First, recognizing the fetus
as a child contradicts Roe's statement that a fetus is not a
child for purposes of the Fourteenth Amendment. 7 7 Second,
the prosecutions rely on a regulatory system that unduly
burdens a woman's right to make decisions regarding her
pregnancy.1 78  Finally, because it can be argued that the
mother's interests in this context are the fundamental rights
to privacy and bodily integrity, any regulations potentially
impinging on these fundamental rights must survive strict
scrutiny such that they are narrowly tailored to achieve a
compelling state interest.
79
B. Implications of Whitner and Other Cases Based on the
Adversarial Model
In addition, a broad statute which makes neglecting a fe-
tus a crime without specifying what constitutes abuse would
fail to define the forms of abuse which constitute crimes.' 80
Therefore, women would lack notice regarding the scope of
their duties toward their fetuses. Furthermore, doctors and
health care providers, who are required to report child abuse,
would be in a difficult predicament, because they, too, would
not know what conduct they were required to report.
In addition, such applications of child abuse statutes are
not narrowly tailored to survive strict scrutiny since they
could allow a degree of infringement on maternal rights not
174. Id. at 1009.
175. Id. at 1009-10.
176. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 572.
177. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156-59 (1973).
178. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 877 (1992).
179. Strict scrutiny is the degree of scrutiny the Supreme Court will apply to
fundamental rights. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973). The Court has held
that "where certain fundamental rights are involved" regulations limiting those
rights must be narrowly drawn to protect only the legitimate state interest at
stake. Id.; see supra Part II.D.1 for judicial development of the right to privacy
as a fundamental right.
180. Nelson, supra note 10, at 313-14.
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justified by the extent of fetal protection offered.' For ex-
ample, child abuse statutes could be interpreted to punish
taking of drugs that are essential to the mother's health, but
result in harm to the fetus. 8 ' Such a result clearly violates
the notion that concerns for maternal health outweigh con-
cerns for fetal health throughout pregnancy. For example, in
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecol-
ogy, 83 the Supreme Court struck down a statute that did not
clearly make maternal health concerns a greater priority
than fetal health.' In Roe v. Wade, the Court prohibited
states from proscribing post-viability abortions if they are
"necessary to preserve the life of the mother." 8
1. Whitner's Flawed Reliance on Roe
The Whitner court cites Roe for the proposition that the
state's interest in a fetus is not only legitimate, but rather it
is compelling. 186 Further, the court found that Whitner has
no fundamental rights in this situation. 187 However, Whit-
ner's reasoning is flawed because Roe explicitly held that rec-
ognizing a state interest in the life of a viable fetus did not
justify the conclusion that a fetus was a person under the
Fourteenth Amendment.'88 However, after citing Roe and its
progeny as establishing that the states have a compelling in-
terest in the life of a viable fetus, Whitner held a pregnant
woman has no rights, fundamental or otherwise, in such a
context. 89 Thus, Whitner cites a compelling interest in the
potential life of the fetus, but ignores the rest of Roe's hold-
ing,9 ° which, as reaffirmed in Casey, establishes that the
state has the power to restrict an abortion after fetal viability
as long as there are exceptions for pregnancies which endan-
ger the mother's health.' Under Roe's trimester framework,
181. Id. at 314-15.
182. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1006.
183. Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetrics and Gynecology, 476 U.S.
747 (1986).
184. Id. at 763.
185. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 163-64 (1973).
186. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 785 (S.C. 1995).
187. Id. at 786.
188. Roe, 410 U.S. at 156-59.
189. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786.
190. Planned Parenthood Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
191. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846.
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and Casey's undue burden standard, the state is limited in
the amount it may impinge on a woman's right to terminate
her pregnancy."' In the third trimester, or post-viability, the
state interest is considerably stronger, such that abortions
can be proscribed except when the mother's health is at is-
sue.' This exception for post-viability abortion, when the
state's interests are the strongest, suggests that even in the
third trimester of pregnancy, the protection of a woman's life
and health supersedes the state's interest in protecting po-
tential human life. Thus, Whitner blatantly refused to recog-
nize the mother's simultaneous interest in her own privacy,
and as a result, Whitner's reliance on Roe to establish the ab-
sence of any rights is a disregards Roe's central holdings.'
2. Whitner Ignores the Right to Privacy Implicated by
Prosecutions Against Pregnant Women
Since Roe did not foreclose the possibility of according
other legal rights to fetuses, the Whitner court rationally
turned to other cases where fetuses have been accorded legal
rights, such as in tort and criminal statutes, to justify ex-
tending the word child to mean fetus.' Whitner reasoned
that it could distinguish itself from cases in other states
which declined to prosecute for prenatal drug abuse because
those states did not recognize tort and criminal actions on
behalf of fetuses.96 However, recognition of the fetus as a
"legal person" in instances where it is the mother's interest
being vindicated such that no maternal-fetal conflict is cre-
ated, in no way creates fetal interests that are assertable by
the government or others against women.' 9' For example, the
Pelligrini court held that a viable fetus is not a person within
the meaning of drug distribution statutes, even though the
state law recognizes tort and criminal actions on behalf of fe-
tuses injured in utero or born dead as a result of in utero in-
juries."' The Pelligrini court reasoned that its state tort and
192. Id.; Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
193. Casey, 505 U.S. at 846; Roe, 410 U.S. at 164.
194. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777 (S.C. 1997).
195. See supra notes 175-177 and accompanying text; Maternal Rights and
Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1009; Johnsen, supra note 29, at 572.
196. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 786.
197. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 579-80.
198. Commonwealth v. Lawrence, 536 N.E.2d 571 (Mass. 1989) (holding that
a viable fetus is a person for purposes of common law crime of murder); Corn-
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criminal actions for fetal harm "accorded legal rights to the
unborn only where the mothers' or parents' interest in the
potentiality of life, not the state's interest, are sought to be
vindicated."'99 Under this rationale, the viable fetus pos-
sesses no rights of its own that deserve vindication."' There-
fore, even though some courts have construed non-explicit
laws to include protection of fetuses,2 °' these cases should be
distinguished from fetal abuse prosecutions by the fact that
criminalizing third party harm does not implicate a right to
privacy.2  In fact, it is difficult to conceive a situation where
the state interest in fetal health could be outweighed by the
rights of a third party. 23 However, the state's interest may
be trumped by a privacy right when maternal conduct is in
question.2 4
The Whitner court argued, on the other hand, that South
Carolina's tort and criminal actions for fetal harm rested on
the state's interest-rather than the mother's interest-in
vindicating the life of the viable fetus.20' Yet, this argument
fails to recognize that in order to view a prosecution as vindi-
cating the state's rights rather than the mother's rights, the
state must conclude that the fetus has a legal status separate
from its mother. In addition, this rationale fails to recognize
that when the woman is vindicating her own rights for fetal
homicide, there are no implications for her right to privacy.
Thus, Whitner's rationale again relies on creating fetal rights
in conflict with the mother's, obscuring the inescapable real-
ity that, physically, a fetus is part of a woman's body. '
3. Lack of Consistency in Recognizing Actions on Behalf
of Fetuses in Tort and Criminal Law
In addition, drawing analogies from the body of tort and
monwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 132 (Mass. 1984) (holding that a fetus is a per-
son for the purposes of vehicular homicide statute); Mone v. Greyhound Lines
Inc., 331 N.E.2d 916 (Mass. 1975) (establishing a wrongful death action on be-
half of viable fetuses injured in utero and subsequently born dead).
199. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1990).
200. Whitner v. South Carolina, 492 S.E.2d 777, 783 (S.C. 1997) (citing Pelli-
grini, No. 87970, slip op. at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct. Oct. 15, 1990)).
201. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Cass, 467 N.E.2d 1324 (Mass. 1984).
202. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1005.
203. Id.
204. Id.
205. Whitner, 492 S.E.2d at 783.
206. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 579.
1282 [Vol. 38
1998] PRENATAL DRUG ABUSE PROSECUTIONS 1283
criminal case law is also highly suspect since treatment of
these issues has been extremely disparate. For example, as
of 1984, thirty-seven states had recognized a cause of action
for prenatal injury.0 7 In most states, recovery is limited to
208
cases in which the fetus was viable at the time of the tort.
Similarly, even though criminal liability attaches in some ju-
risdictions for intentional acts leading to fetal death under
either homicide or feticide statutes, it is usually limited to vi-
able fetuses. 9 Moreover, courts are split over whether to ex-
tend protection for fetuses into criminal statutes that do not
specifically mention the unborn.21 Although the conclusions
one should draw from this disparate treatment should be
limited to some extent, live-birth and viability requirements
and the non-enforcement of criminal statutes can be inter-
preted as evincing a lesser state interest in protecting fetuses
from harm than in protecting the born. 2  Thus, the treat-
ment of fetal injuries in other areas supports the proposition
that a state's interest in preventing fetal abuse is less com-
pelling than its interest in protecting a child from post-natal
harm.
212
C. Lack of Precedent for Fetal Abuse Statutes
Because Roe and Casey both adopt the facilitative model
of fetal-maternal rights, no precedent exists for coercive fetal
abuse statutes. As previously stated, proponents of coercive
state action for fetal abuse statutes argue that fetuses which
will not be aborted have a future interest in their well-being,
such that maternal acts or omissions which endanger the fe-
tus should be prosecuted. 3 To support this contention, pro-
ponents of pre-birth seizures and post-birth sanctions cite the
state's ability to prohibit abortions in the third trimester, ex-
207. Id.; Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1003-04 (citing
Ron Beal, Note, Can I Sue Mommy? An Analysis of a Woman's Tort Liability for
Prenatal Injuries to Her Child Born Alive, 21 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 325, 332
(1984)).
208. See, e.g., Toth v. Goree, 237 N.W.2d 297, 302 (Mich. App. 1975) (denying
recovery for injuries sustained to previable fetus).
209. See, e.g., People v. Smith, 129 Cal. Rptr. 498 (Ct. App.1976).
210. See, e.g., Reyes v. Superior Court, 141 Cal. Rptr. 912, 913 (Ct. App.
1977) (refusing to read fetal protection into California child abuse statute that
did not mention fetuses).
211. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1005.
212. Id.
213. Warren, supra note 22, at 287.
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cept when necessary to save the life of the mother, as a rec-
ognition that a woman who decides not to terminate her
pregnancy in the first two trimesters has voluntarily waived
the right to engage in any harmful conduct towards the fe-
tus.214 For example, John Robertson makes a distinction be-
tween freedom to procreate and freedom in procreation.215 He
argues that once a woman decides to carry a pregnancy to
term she impliedly waives the right to make her own deci-
sions about how her pregnancy will be conducted.216 Thus, a
woman has a legal duty not to put her fetus at risk and can
be subject to homicide or child abuse charges for violating
that duty.217
This obligation, carried to its logical conclusion, requires
that a pregnant woman could be forced to consent to fetal
therapy or prohibited from smoking, drinking or otherwise
failing to maintain her health. The notion of implied waiver,
however, raises the question it is supposed to answer-
whether an interest in protecting fetuses can outweigh ma-
ternal autonomy. Thus, one is left at the same point at which
one began. A prosecution for otherwise legal behavior raises
troubling questions in that it presupposes that a woman who
elects to continue a pregnancy has forfeited legal rights en-
joyed by all other competent adults who have been convicted
of no crime.21
Proponents of coercive fetal abuse prosecutions further
argue that, although parents have a great deal of discretion
in deciding how to raise their children, they do not have ab-
solute freedom because they are morally and legally obligated
not to inflict harm on their children.2 9 Parents who injure
their children or fail to provide adequate food, clothing or
medical care can have their children taken away from them
and may even face criminal sanctions.22 ° Such arguments
lack merit because they fail to recognize that pregnant
women are not immunized from prosecution under generally
applicable criminal statutes that would punish illegal drug
214. Robertson, supra note 23, at 405 n.3.
215. Id. at 410.
216. Id. at 463.
217. Id.
218. Warren, supra note 22, at 290.
219. Steinbock, supra note 1, at 275-76.
220. Id. at 276.
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use.22 1 However, many women have been singled out for spe-
cial prosecutions and additional penalties solely because they
were pregnant at the time of drug use. Prosecutions have
relied on criminal statutes for drug delivery and distribution
that were never intended to be used in this manner and that
impose harsher penalties than those for possession.223
There is no precedent for a waiver of maternal rights be-
cause, if a woman could truly be seen as waiving maternal
rights, any situation in which a mother declined medical
treatment possibly beneficial to the fetus would be illegal.
However, women have been able to decline surgery which
their physicians regard as beneficial to the fetus and have
been able to refuse cesarean sections even when doing so may
cause the baby to die. 24 Furthermore, the state has continu-
ally been reluctant to intrude into the lives or bodies of one
individual for the sake of another, even when the individual's
life is at stake.2 In fact, our legal system has typically re-
fused to force one person to help another, even when doing so
would save the other from injury or death. 26 For example,
individuals have unsuccessfully sought court orders to com-
pel one person to undergo a medical procedure for the benefit
of another, illustrating the court's reluctance to invade into
the sanctity of one's body for the benefit of another individ-
ual. 27 Precedent has firmly established that one person's
medical needs cannot readily override another person's right
to autonomy and physical integrity. Therefore, John Robert-
son's interpretation of Roe as a waiver of a pregnant woman's
personal autonomy remains problematic and unsupported by
case law.28
D. Fetal Abuse Prosecutions Based on the Adversarial Model
Threaten Constitutional Liberty
Prosecutions for fetal abuse necessarily raise profound
concerns about privacy and bodily autonomy because the fe-
tus (or future child) can be protected only through the body of
221. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 579.
222. Id.
223. See, eg., Johnson v. State, 602 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. 1992).
224. Nelson, supra note 10, at 311.
225. Id.
226. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 583.
227. See supra notes 158-165 and accompanying text.
228. Warren, supra note 22, at 290.
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the pregnant woman or through controlling the behavior of
the pregnant woman during pregnancy."' For example, al-
lowing the government to impose special penalties and re-
strictions on pregnant women's actions in order to promote
asserted interests in the fetus could enable government to
dictate a woman's conduct at every stage of pregnancy.3 '
Thus, women could be regulated by the state for otherwise
legal activities, such as drinking or smoking, since the deci-
sions at issue in fetal abuse cases concern both procreative
and non-procreative issues, including what to drink or eat,
when to visit the doctor, whether to have sex, etc.23' Regu-
lating such decisions for all people-for example, banning all
alcohol consumption-has no procreative significance. 3 ' If,
however, states limit consumption only for pregnant women,
they would be regulating the procreative aspects of the deci-
sion whether to drink. '33 Laws seeking to control the inci-
dents of procreation infringe on a woman's power to make de-
cisions about how she will live her life during her
pregnancy. '  Thus, fetal abuse cases implicate the right to
make decisions that affect the spheres of family, marriage
and procreation, as well as the right to control one's own
body. 35
Since it seems well established from previous case law
that the Court would have to recognize a right to make deci-
sions concerning one's body during pregnancy, regulations
which affect this right must be subject to constitutional scru-
tiny.2 '36 However, the issue remains which level of scrutiny to
apply. Until Casey, it had been well established that if a
229. Steinbock, supra note 1, at 276.
230. Dawn Johnsen, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: From Driving
to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives after Webster,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 180 (1989).
231. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1000.
232. Id.
233. Id.
234. Id. This is contrasted with Robertson's view that once a woman makes
the decision she no longer has a free right, but, rather, must make decisions not
to "act in ways that would adversely affect the fetus." See Robertson, supra
note 23, at 437. Robertson's theory stems from the idea that it is not fair to
give a woman the benefit of a right that she has deliberately forgone in that by
choosing not to abort, the woman has decided to live her life in a proscribed
manner. Id.
235. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 998.
236. See infra Part II.D. for discussion about the right to make decisions
concerning ones body during pregnancy.
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right deemed fundamental, such as the right to privacy im-
plicated by abortion or choices during pregnancy, then as the
Court stated in Roe, "[w]here certain 'fundamental rights' are
involved, the Court has held that the regulation limiting
these rights may be justified only by a 'compelling state in-
terest', and that legislative enactments must be narrowly
drawn to express only the legitimate state interests at
stake."237 Thus, Roe developed a trimester framework to re-
flect the growing state interest in the potentiality of life
which becomes compelling in the last trimester.38 In Casey,
however, the Court rejected the trimester framework and the
notion that all pre-viability regulations must be struck down
under strict scrutiny."9 Therefore, after Casey, it appears
that the State's interest in the fetus pre-viability may war-
rant government intrusion.24 ° In addition, the state's interest
in the potentiality of life from conception may warrant intru-
sions that do not create an undue burden on the exercise of
reproductive rights."'
The new standard adopted by Casey is the undue burden
standard. 42 However, the court did not make it clear
whether this should be the new standard for a fundamental
right or whether it decided that the right to an abortion is not
fundamental and that the undue burden standard is the cor-
rect level of scrutiny for important, but not quite fundamen-
tal, rights.243 Regardless, it appears that the undue burden
standard constitutes an intermediate level of scrutiny falling
somewhere between a rational relationship and strict scru-
tiny, since regulations similar to ones which had been previ-
ously struck down by Roe, were upheld in Casey.244 There-
fore, it seems obvious that if a regulation cannot withstand
the undue burden analysis, it will definitely be struck down
by a strict scrutiny analysis. Thus, the inquiry begins with
237. Dorothy E. Roberts, Punishing Drug Addicts Who Have Babies : Women
of Color, Equality, and the Right to Privacy, 104 HARv. L. REV. 1419, 1467
n.239 (citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973)).
238. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
239. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 878 (1992).
240. Id.
241. Id.
242. Id.
243. See, e.g., id.
244. See, e.g., id. For example, parental consent provisions and 24 hour
waiting periods were previously struck down, but were held not to constitute an
undue burden in Casey. Casey, 505 U.S. at 876.
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an undue burden analysis as articulated in Casey.245
E. Punitive Measures in the Fetal Abuse Context Constitute
an Undue Burden
Criminal law punishes acts it deems morally culpable for
one of two reasons. From a utilitarian perspective, punish-
ment is justified only if it is likely to result in some net social
benefit.246 In contrast, from a retributivist perspective, the
guilty should suffer, hence punishment need not be justified
by other social benefits.4 7 Thus, a law that attains either of
these ends without unduly burdening the ultimate right to
privacy should be upheld. However, in the context of prose-
cutions for prenatal drug abuse, neither of these ends are at-
tained.
For example, the alleged state interest in fetal abuse
prosecutions is protecting the health of the fetus. However,
most threats of prosecution for prenatal drug abuse have the
effect of deterring women from seeking drug treatment that
could end the drug abuse and prevent fetal harm.248 As pre-
viously discussed, the USGAO reports that fear of prosecu-
tion and loss of custody act as a "barrier to treatment" for
pregnant women dependent on drugs.249 Furthermore, the
American Medical Association has also expressed similar
concerns because women are deterred from seeking prenatal
care or refraining from telling their physicians about their
drug use, which could prevent many of the problems associ-
ated with drug abuse during pregnancy.25 °
In addition, even if the prosecutions could be proven to
further the state's interest in the potential life's well-being,
they would not survive the "least restrictive alternative"
standard that requires that "even though the governmental
purpose be legitimate and substantial that purpose cannot be
pursued by means that broadly stifle fundamental personal
245. See infra Part IV.E.
246. Warren, supra note 22, at 294.
247. Id.
248. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 603.
249. Id. (citing U.S. GEN. ACCOUNTING OFFICE, DRUG EXPOSED INFANTS: A
GENERATION AT RISK (1990)); see supra Part II.B.
250. Id. at 603 n.151 (citing American Medical Ass'n, Legal Interventions
During Pregnancy: Court-Ordered Medical Treatments and Legal Penalties for
Potentially Harmful Behavior by Pregnant Women, 264 JAMA 2663, 2667
(1990)).
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liberties when the end can be more narrowly achieved." 5'
Providing adequate drug treatment and prenatal care for
poor women are more narrowly tailored and effective means
for the state to address the problem of drug-exposed babies. 5 '
Therefore, punitive sanctions must be struck down.
Thus, if a state was really concerned about the health of
the unborn child, it would ensure that women were not de-
terred form seeking prenatal care and would also ensure
adequate drug treatment for not only non-pregnant, but also
pregnant women. 53 However, despite the great need for drug
and alcohol treatment programs, many pregnant women
cannot obtain access to one.25" This is because many treat-
ment programs routinely refuse to admit pregnant women,
and those that do admit pregnant women have long waiting
lists.55
Because prosecutions do not effectively further the
state's interest in fetal health, and may actually exacerbate
the problem by deterring women from seeking treatment,
prosecutions for fetal abuse cannot pass constitutional mus-
ter. More specifically, just as the state can burden a woman's
ability to get an abortion to the extent that the regulation
helps the woman make an informed decision, the state can
burden a woman's liberty during pregnancy to the extent that
it achieves the state interest in a viable fetus as long as it
does not unduly burden the woman's exercise of her privacy
or liberty rights. Fetal abuse statutes do not achieve the
state's interest in protecting potential life because they deter
women from seeking prenatal care, and, thus, they are un-
duly burdensome.25 In addition, these forms of coercion se-
verely violate women's rights to privacy, liberty, autonomy
and physical integrity which would be unjustifiable even if
251. Roberts, supra note 237, at 1456 (citing Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479,
488 (1960)).
252. Id. at 1456.
253. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 613.
254. Id. at 605 (citing Born Hooked: Confronting the Impact of Prenatal Sub-
stance Abuse: Hearing Before the House Select Committee on Children, Youth
and Families, 101st Cong., 110, 112 (1989) (Statement of Wendy Chavkin,
M.D., M.P.H., Rockefeller Fellow, Sergievsky Center, Columbia School of Public
Health)).
255. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 605 (citing Molly McNulty, Pregnancy Police:
The Health, Policy and Legal Implications of Punishing Pregnant Women for
Harm to Their Fetuses, 16 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 277 (1987-88)).
256. See, e. g., Johnsen, supra note 29, at 601, 613.
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there were a net benefit to society.257 Further, these types of
coercion presume that just because a woman is pregnant she
has forfeited her fundamental rights of autonomy and bodily
integrity. Therefore, before the state can impose regulations
on a women's conduct during pregnancy that will be applied
only to women by virtue of the fact that only women can bear
children, the courts should strictly scrutinize the regulations
to ensure that they actually further the government's interest
and do not unnecessarily infringe on a woman's liberty.2 8
V. PROPOSAL
Prenatal substance abuse presents a growing problem in
the United States. However, child abuse prosecutions based
on construing the word child to include a fetus have the effect
of creating a conflict between the mother and fetus which
fails to account for the interconnected relationship of mother
and fetus.
If the adversarial model is employed to prosecute prena-
tal conduct, there is no logical stopping point, thus allowing
convictions for otherwise legal conduct. However, if the fetus
is granted no rights at all, the mother can do whatever she
likes during pregnancy with no regard to the fetus at all.
Therefore, the facilitative model should govern fetal abuse
because it recognizes that pregnant women have to make
numerous decisions that require balancing uncertain risks to
the fetus against competing demands in their lives.259
Through that recognition, the right to privacy in reproductive
decision making is necessarily balanced by the fetus's inter-
est in potential life. As stated by Dawn Johnsen, "this model
recognizes that women who bear children share the govern-
ment's objective of promoting healthy babies, but that exist-
ing obstacles-and not bad intentions-impede the attain-
ment of this common goal."
260
Laws seeking to control the incidents of procreation in-
fringe on a woman's power to make decisions about how she
257. Warren, supra note 22, at 287.
258. Dawn Johnsen, Webster v. Reproductive Health Services: From Driving
to Drugs: Governmental Regulation of Pregnant Women's Lives after Webster,
138 U. PA. L. REV. 179, 180 (1989).
259. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 574.
260. Id. at 571.
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will live her life during her pregnancy. 6' Therefore, the right
to "control procreative liberty and familial decisions should
also apply to the maternal decisions potentially infringed
upon by fetal abuse legislation."262 Because fetal abuse cases
implicate two aspects of the right to privacy: (1) the right to
make decisions that affect the spheres of family, marriage,
and procreation, and (2) the right to control one's own body,26
case law on point, such as Casey, should govern. Therefore,
as in Roe and Casey, the fetus should not be granted the legal
status of a person. 64 In addition, any regulations should not
unduly burden a woman's right to privacy. Because coercive
state action often prevents women from obtaining adequate
prenatal care, courts and the government should protect
women's rights to privacy by preventing coercive state action
after the harm has been done to the fetus. Therefore, this
comment proposes that rather than deprive women of the
right to make judgments or punish them after the fact for
making "wrong" choices, states should seek to expand
women's choices by improving access to prenatal care and
substance abuse treatment.65
VI. CONCLUSION
Although prenatal abuse constitutes a growing problem
in the United States, the solution should not rely on granting
the fetus its own legal status, which has far reaching implica-
tions for women since it "creates a false impression that an
inherent conflict exists between promoting healthy births and
protecting women's fundamental liberties."66 Prior to fetal
abuse prosecutions, a fetus had been granted rights distinct
from the mother only in the narrow areas of tort and criminal
law where the rights of the mother, rather than the rights of
a third party, are being vindicated.26 ' Therefore, holding that
a fetus is a child for purposes of child abuse statutes is not
only problematic but unprecedented because it relegates
261. Id.; see supra note 234.
262. Maternal Rights and Fetal Wrongs, supra note 2, at 1000.
263. Id. at 998.
264. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).
265. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 613.
266. Id.
267. Commonwealth v. Pelligrini, No. 87970, slip. op. at 11 (Mass. Super. Ct.
Oct. 15, 1990).
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women to the position of fetal containers. Thus, any actions
which potentially harm the fetus, whether legal or non-legal,
could be used to prosecute women, thus infringing on
women's liberty interest." Furthermore, this impingement
is unjustified because it has the effect of deterring behaviors
necessary to promote healthy and safe pregnancies. 269 There-
fore, any attempts to combat prenatal abuse must account for
the intricately intertwined interests of both woman and fetus
so that just policies that do not impinge arbitrarily on a
woman's liberty are developed. Because state intervention
into women's bodies and their other legally protected rights is
highly intrusive, courts should not uphold such interventions
using vague standards of their own creation which do not en-
compass procedural safeguards.
Sarah Letitia Kowalski
268. Johnsen, supra note 29, at 572.
269. Id. at 613.
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